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Vulnerability held not to be a necessary pre-requisite for establishing a duty of care in claims of 
pure economic loss 
In 2011, headlines were made when Alcoa sued Apache Energy and its partners for $158 million, a 
loss it claimed was a consequence of Apache Energy failing to adequately inspect and maintain the 
gas pipelines that supplied the gas used by Alcoa in its business.  As the loss was not a consequence 
of any property damage or injury to Alcoa, the loss is characterised as pure economic loss.   
Alcoa commenced proceedings against Apache Energy and its partners for damages for the pure 
economic loss it had suffered as a result of the breach of the duties owed by the appellants.   
Apache Energy applied to the court for summary dismissal of the negligence claims on the grounds 
that a reasonable cause of action was not disclosed and the claims were frivolous and vexatious. It 
was argued that: 
 Vulnerability was a necessary pre-requisite for establishing a duty of care for pure economic 
loss and that Alcoa was not vulnerable as it had the power to negotiate the allocation of risk 
under its contracts. 
 Although concurrent duties in tort and contract can arise, the terms of the contracts 
between Alcoa and Apache Energy precluded a duty of care in respect of pure economic 
loss.  
Le Miere J dismissed the application, holding that the law of duty of care for economic loss was not 
sufficiently certain to justify a summary judgment application.1  Apache Energy appealed that 
decision in Apache Energy Ltd v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (No 2) [2013] WASCA 213.  All three members 
of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Apache Energy had not demonstrated that 
Le Miere J’s decision in the lower court was incorrect or had sufficient doubt to justify a grant of 
leave. 
Background 
Alcoa (the respondent) had long-term contracts with Apache Energy (the appellants), co-owners of 
gas processing and transport facilities, for the supply of gas for its alumina refineries.  On 3 June 
2008, an explosion and fire at the appellants’ facilities where the gas was produced, processed and 
transported, caused a gas pipeline to rupture. This caused an interruption to the supply of gas to the 
respondent and it had to acquire alternative energy supplies in order to operate its refineries.  The 
alternative energy cost $138 million more than the cost of the supply of gas as under the contracts 
with the appellants.  As the loss was a consequence of physical damage to pipelines in the control of 
the appellants, the claim in negligence was for damages for pure economic loss. 
Claiming for pure economic loss in negligence has always proven to be a difficult area of the law that 
has never had principles that may be applied with certainty.  Since Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 
CLR 180, the approach of courts to novel cases of negligence has been to adopt the ‘salient features’ 
analysis.  This approach requires that the pure economic loss be reasonably foreseeable in the 
circumstances and there be a consideration of the defendant’s control and the plaintiff’s 
vulnerability, the relationships between the parties, the coherency of the law, and policy issues, such 
as indeterminate liability.  
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Duty of Care 
The respondent alleged that a duty of care was owed to it on the following grounds: 
 The respondent had entered into contracts with the appellants for the supply of gas for the 
purpose of operating its refineries; 
 The gas supplied under the contracts was produced at the appellants’ facilities at Varanus 
Island and delivered to the respondent through gas pipelines from Varanus Island to the 
Australian mainland; 
 The appellants controlled the facilities which included the operation, management and 
maintenance of the gas pipelines; 
 The appellants were aware that the gas pipelines provided the fuel to the respondent for the 
operation of its refineries; 
 The appellants were aware that a pipeline in a specific area was susceptible to corrosion and 
due to the proximity of it to other pipelines, the other pipelines were vulnerable and 
susceptible to being severely damaged should there be a rupture; 
 If a pipeline was ruptured there was a significant risk that the pipelines would be damaged 
to the extent that the supply of gas from the appellants’ facilities would not be possible; 
 The appellants held itself out as having the control of the operation, management and 
maintenance of the facilities to the relevant statutory authorities and customers, and 
therefore had assumed responsibility to operate and maintain the pipelines in a proper and 
workmanlike manner and in accordance with good pipeline operation practice as required 
by Petroleum Pipelines Regulations 1970 (WA) reg 7; 
 The respondent relied upon the appellants to operate and maintain the pipelines as required 
and had no means of monitoring or ensuring this; 
 The cost of the respondent acquiring alternative fuels for its refineries, if there was 
substantial interruption to the gas supplies, was significantly higher than the cost  of the gas 
purchased under the contracts and the appellants were not prepared to enter into a 
contract to compensate the respondent for the increased cost to allow operation of the 
refineries to continue if there should be an interruption to the gas supply; and 
 The respondent was vulnerable to suffering economic loss from any substantial cessation of 
supply of gas from the appellants’ facilities if the pipelines were not operated and 
maintained as required. 
The respondent argued that the appellants knew, or ought reasonably to have known, of these 
matters.  It was alleged that it was foreseeable to the appellants that if the pipeline was not properly 
maintained a rupture due to corrosion was likely to occur which was likely to lead to the rupture of 
other pipelines in the vicinity which would cause the cessation of all gas supplies for a substantial 
period, and this would lead to the respondent suffering economic loss.  Based on these factors, the 
respondent claimed it was owed a duty of care by the appellants to exercise reasonable care in 
operating, maintaining and / or repairing the pipelines to prevent a rupture to avoid causing 
economic loss to the respondent. 
Vulnerability 
It was argued by the appellants that vulnerability was a pre-requisite for a duty to be owed, and as 
the respondent was not vulnerable, no duty of care arose.  As evidence of the lack of vulnerability 
the appellants pointed to the fact that the respondent was aware of the risk of an interruption to 
the supply of gas and could take steps to protect itself if this occurred; there was no problem with 
the respondent obtaining alternative supplies of gas; it had systems that allowed its refineries to 
operate on diesel instead of gas; and it had insured against the relevant loss (at [19]). 
McLure P (with whom Newnes JA agreed) held at [20]: 
There is no binding authority that vulnerability is a necessary condition of a duty of care to avoid pure 
economic loss. The plurality in Woolcock expressly declined to take that step [24]. Even McHugh J 
does not go that far: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36; (1999) 198 CLR 180 [118]. In any event, 
there is no fixed or certain scope of the concept of vulnerability. The nature and degree of 
vulnerability sufficient to support a duty will vary from case to case, category to category: Perre [129] 
(McHugh J). 
Buss JA’s judgment thoroughly examines the cases of pure economic loss, with a focus on the issue 
of a plaintiff’s vulnerability.  The appellants’ argument was based upon the statement of Gleeson CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd: 
Since Caltex Oil, and most notably in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd, the vulnerability of the plaintiff has 
emerged as an important requirement in cases where a duty of care to avoid economic loss has been 
held to have been owed (emphasis added).
2
 
The appellants stated that ‘the effect that a finding that a plaintiff is not vulnerable puts to an end 
any inquiry about the existence of a duty of care’ (at [225]). 
At [232]-[233], referring to the ‘salient features’ approach in Perre, Buss JA stated: 
The court must focus on the factors which militate in favour of and against the imposition of a duty of 
care, and this assessment must be undertaken and the ultimate conclusion arrived at as a matter of 
principle.  
The “vulnerability” of a plaintiff appears to be a highly significant “salient feature” in deciding 
whether the defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the plaintiff from 
suffering pure economic loss. The notion of “vulnerability”, in this context, refers to the plaintiff’s 
inability to protect itself from the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care, either completely 
or, at least, in a manner which would impose the consequences of loss on the defendant.  
His Honour noted that in Perre it was held by McHugh J that vulnerability was ‘ordinarily a 
prerequisite to imposing a duty’3 and Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ’s statement in 
Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd,4 above, noted vulnerability was important where a duty had 
been established, and in the same case McHugh J referred to vulnerability as a ‘key issue’.5  Buss JA 
concluded at [239]: 
It is true that Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ emphasised in Woolcock that vulnerability 
had become an important requirement in cases where a duty of care had been found to have been 
established. However, in my opinion, their Honours did not hold that vulnerability was an essential 
‘salient feature’ in all cases or that, in the absence of vulnerability, a duty of care to avoid pure 
economic loss could not, as a matter of law, arise in any case. The point is, at least, attended by 
doubt. 
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As to whether the respondent was vulnerable, the appellants argued that the interest that the 
respondent was trying to protect had to be identified before vulnerability could be determined.  It 
was put forward that the respondent’s interest was having access to gas to carry out its operations.  
The fact that the respondent would have preferred a different allocation of risk in the contracts and 
that it had to purchase alternative energy resources at a higher price was not vulnerability in the 
legal sense.  The appellants argued that it was not a risk to which the respondent was exposed due 
to 'by reason of ignorance or social, political or economic constraints' as referred to in Woolcock 
Street Investments Pty Ltd. However, the respondent argued that it was vulnerable in that it could 
not monitor the condition of the pipelines. The appellants denied this on the grounds that the 
respondent could not have an interest in the pipelines, as it was prohibited by legislation, and that it 
could under the terms of the contracts access gas from other suppliers should supply from Varanus 
Island be disrupted. 
McLure P considered the recent High Court decision of Barclay v Penberthy (2012) 246 CLR 258, 
observing at [46] that there were: 
indications … that the notion that an intending party to a contract “could protect itself [in the 
Woolcock sense] from pure economic loss in its contract” may be narrowly confined to the question 
of whether or not the other contracting party would in fact have agreed to a request from the plaintiff 
for the insertion of a relevant term in the contract. Thus it is arguable that the [appellants’] refusal to 
accept full contractual liability for a failure to perform their supply obligation to [the respondent] 
under the gas sales agreements is an indication of its vulnerability, as [the respondent] contends. 
Buss JA held that the claim of vulnerability was not ‘so clearly untenable that it must fail’ (at [252]).  
The fact that the respondent could access alternative energy at a higher price was a consequence of 
its vulnerability, not the vulnerability (at [255]).  Also, as the issue of whether the respondent could 
have walked away from the contract if not satisfied with the allocation of risk, as put forward by the 
appellants, was a question of fact it required evidence and a determination at trial (at [259]). At 
[261] his Honour held: 
the nature and extent of any vulnerability which may be required to establish a duty of care by a 
defendant to protect the plaintiff from the risk of pure economic loss is, no doubt, fact specific, and 
may vary depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
Therefore, in light of the current law, it was arguable on the facts pleaded by the respondent that it 
was vulnerable. 
Concurrent Duties in Contract and Tort 
The appellants argued that the contracts for supply of gas precluded a duty in tort as the contracts 
exclusively declared the legal rights and obligations of the parties.  This claim was based upon the 
argument that the law will not impose a tortious duty if the same duty has been rejected as an 
implied term of the contract.6 As the contracts for the supply of gas did not have an implied term 
that reasonable care would be exercised to supply gas or to prevent rupture of the pipeline, the 
appellants claimed there could be no duty of care owed in tort. 
Buss JA noted at [199] that McHugh J in Perre warned that ‘courts must be careful before holding 
that the existence of obligations under a contract automatically denies liability in tort for pure 
                                                          
6
 See Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal [1987] 1 SCR 711; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong 
Hing Bank Ltd [1986] 1 AC 80, 107; Central Trust Co v Rafuse [1986] 2 SCR 147, 206. 
economic loss’.7  His Honour examined the case law and concluded at [211] that it was ‘reasonably 
arguable that the duty of care alleged by [the respondent] is not inconsistent with the terms of the 
Supply Contracts and that the Supply Contracts do not exclude or limit liability for the acts or 
omissions which constitute the tort pleaded by [the respondent].’  The duty pleaded by the 
respondent was a duty to exercise reasonable care in ‘supervising, overseeing and / or monitoring 
the operation, maintenance and / or repair’ of the gas pipelines – not a duty to take reasonable 
steps to supply gas as based upon the contracts.  Buss JA reasoned that this duty was arguably not 
founded on ‘a duty to supply or deliver gas under the Supply Contracts’ (at [212]) and it was 
‘reasonably arguable that the terms of the Supply Contracts, properly construed, do not exclude or 
limit the claims by [the respondent] under the law of negligence for loss of the kind pleaded by it’ (at 
[213]). 
Once again the current state of the law was referred to as a reason why the appellants’ argument 
failed, Buss JA stating at [215]: 
although a contracting party will not be subjected to a duty of care in tort towards another 
contracting party if the duty is inconsistent with the terms of the contract, I am not persuaded that, 
on the current state of the law as enunciated by the High Court, it is essential that any tortious duty 
be co-extensive or identical with duties or obligations imposed under any relevant contract between 
the parties. That is, I am not persuaded that, on the current state of the law, a duty under the law of 
negligence to exercise reasonable care and skill can only arise between parties to a contractual 
relationship if there is a concurrent duty in contract. 
Conclusion 
Vulnerability may have many meanings and it may now go beyond the concept as identified by the 
High Court in Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 609 and Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty 
Ltd.  Kirby J in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd was in the minority when he was of 
the opinion that a commercial entity may be vulnerable.  The decision of Apache Energy Ltd v Alcoa 
of Australia Ltd (No 2) clearly demonstrates that the courts are willing to consider the possibility that 
a commercial entity may be vulnerable.  This is also evidenced by the recent New South Wales Court 
of Appeal decision, The Owners – Strata Plan No 61288 v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd [2013] 
NSWCA 317.  In that case, Basten JA stated at [35]: 
In a practical sense, vulnerability may have three aspects, namely inability to - 
(a)  control or influence the physical events which gave rise to the loss; 
(b) negotiate a contractual arrangement imposing liability on the defendant, or 
(c) obtain insurance against the economic loss suffered. 
Vulnerability is only one factor to be considered when damages are claimed for pure economic loss, 
but as Buss JA notes in Apache Energy Ltd v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (No 2) at [233] the ‘”vulnerability” 
of a plaintiff appears to be a highly significant “salient feature”’ and obviously requires careful 
consideration when the party suffering loss is a commercial entity. 
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